Abstract: This paper examines a dimension of public law which, despite the increased frequency of litigation in this area, remains relatively under-explored: the constitution and foreign affairs. To aid this task, two models are elaborated. The first, the unilateralist or sovereigntist model, assumes a sharp separation between the internal and the external as domains of peace (constitution) and war (reason of state) respectively. The second model assumes that juridical boundaries are contested and permeable, reading the dynamics of constitutional development in terms of a process of mutual recognition. While the former may have had more historical traction, I argue that the latter now provides the better guide, both analytically and normatively. The theoretical argument is developed in relation to the lived tradition of the British constitution. The paper closes with a series of propositions that seek to capture the emerging principles within this complex and fast-moving area of law.
torture and rendition -in collaboration with the US and Gaddafi's Libya -in relation to which British intelligence agents were actively complicit. and from the realm of public international law, not just international humanitarian law (as applied to non-international armed conflicts) but also the law relating to both UN Security Council Resolutions and NATO operations. On reading the Court of Appeal's judgment in the case, 11 whatever one thinks of its merits, one's instinct is to marvel at the capacity of the judges to hold together so many diverse contrapuntal strands of legal argument.
Cases like Belhaj, Serdar Mohamed and Youssef, while especially complex, are not unusual in their recourse to non-national as well as national sources of legal authority. To give a sense of how frequent such recourse actual is, I examined the UK Supreme Court caseload for 2014. The overall caseload broke down into 56% 'public law' cases and 44% 'other'. 12 Of the public law cases, 84% referenced international or transnational or foreign law. And in 87%
of those cases, the reference to the non-domestic law was substantial to the reasoning. These 12 For these purposes, the 'public law' category includes crime and tax matters but not planning and environment law, competition law, public procurement and general regulatory matters.
figures are startling, even when we take into account that many of those references are to the ECHR. In 59% of public law cases, I found the ECHR to be substantially relevant. In 81% of the public law cases where I found non-domestic law to be substantial, the ECHR was substantial to the reasoning. What happened in respect of the 'other' or non-public law category is just as interesting. I found that 52% of those cases referenced international or transnational or foreign law; and in 73% of those cases, the reference was substantial.
These figures are only meant to be indicative. They nonetheless suggest that we might need to reconsider the nature of the law being adjudicated upon, at least within our highest court and especially in public law matters. To the extent that they are robust, Lord Bingham's observation in his 2010 Hamlyn lectures about international and comparative law widening judicial horizons begins to look tame. 13 The great Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen's comment, made many decades ago, seems closer to the mark. 'Evolution in terms of legal technique', he wrote, 'tends in the end to blur the distinction between international law and the state legal system.' 14 We have reached the stage where it is plausible to claim that almost any serious case of English law, especially English public law, is now most likely also to be a conflicts of law case, in the sense that it will involve the reconciliation of two or more distinct bodies of legal authority.
These observations are germane to what follows. But the paper really focuses on an important subset of these cases. Foreign affairs matters, whether in court or before other state institutions, take place within a decision-making framework that is still partly shaped by imperial norms and habits. Boye Sahaba and similar cases from the heyday of empire are still used as precedents. But these decisions are also taken within a world order where the relationship between law and force is being redefined, albeit partially, and in which international law and human rights play more significant roles. As such, for all their multiplicity foreign affairs cases heard today share a common core. At that is, the idea of the state as the Prince's personal fiefdom with which he could direct as he willed -is especially pronounced. Put somewhat less abstractly, the question becomes this: in the absence of wholesale constitutional reform, we have no choice but to work from existing constitutional fundamentals; but is it possible to do this while avoiding those precedents that strike us now as misguided, and through which, were they to be followed, injustice might again be disguised under the banner of law?
II
Constitutions have both an inner and an outer membrane. They face outwards as well as inwards and these two faces are related. How a political order engages with the world outside it impacts on the way it constructs itself internally. This idea, largely lost from the discourse, was elementary to the writers in the great tradition of constitutional thought from
Montesquieu and Burke to Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen. Boundary questions are largely ignored in public law today. In constitutional theory, writers assume that they are dealing with an all but autonomous structure: the constitution of the nation state. In constitutional history, there is very little consideration of how the external activities of the English or, later, British state related to the development of the constitution -this despite the centrality of colonial and imperial concerns throughout much of its history. 16 As a result, the hidden assumptions at work need to be recovered.
To help me in this task, two models are outlined. I call them the unilateral and the reflexive or mutually constitutive models. They trace what I take to be widely held understandings of the relationship between the constitution's inner and outer membranes. I suspect that most public lawyers assume that juridical reality corresponds to something like the first model. To the extent that they do, they remain in the grip of Hobbes. justly famous is an inherently imperial one. Played outside its existing territorial confines, the implication of the claim that the state is sovereign in Hobbes's sense is that it has the capacity, unrestricted by any higher legal system, to extend its jurisdiction territorially and materially.
Locke filled out the foreign affairs dimension of this model. Calling it the 'federative power' -essentially the power to make and unmake alliances -he assumed that it was an extra-legal zone, incapable of being 'directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws'. As such, he
argued, 'what is to be done in relation to Foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the Prudence of those who have this Power committed to them'. 22 The federative power functions in tandem with its domestic analogue, the prerogative. Both powers, which Locke carefully separates, come under the discretion of the executive. The exercise of these powers is to be judged not by reference to standards of earthly law but by an appeal to God. That is, action in this discretionary zone is to be legitimated, or not as the case may be, ultimately through a trial of strength. Taking the legitimating properties of the Almighty out of the equation, the picture that we get from Locke is this. In these two constitutionally peripheral but politically vital zones, both within the jurisdiction and outside it, might makes right. The obvious objection to this structure of mutual recognition is that it relies on a degree of bootstrapping, the equivalent of being asked 'which comes first, the chicken or the egg?' and replying 'both'. Given international law's present condition, the objection is not in practice overwhelming, as new states join an established and reasonably coherent international order.
Conceptually, we might respond to the objection by saying that almost any act of juridical creation involves a significant element of projection. Focusing for a moment on the more obviously internal phases of constitution forming -so, stages 1 and 2 above -this element 23 concern is with Parliament -to direct and control the administration synoptically.
Transposed to international law, the two logics help to explain how we got to where we are. Third, it has enormous difficulty in understanding international law as authoritative. We will see an example of this in a moment when we turn to a recent paper by John Finnis. Fourth, the unilateral or sovereigntist model, somewhat paradoxically, has a problem with sovereignty. Insofar as it rests on the idea of the sovereign as uncontrolled controller, both part of the law and outside it, there is nothing within the theory that compels that sovereign authority to act through law as opposed to mere force.
Let us pause on this last point. Hobbes himself presented the Sovereign's predicament in terms of a choice between Law and Power, arguing that while it was rational for the sovereign to chose Law it was not strictly compulsory for him or it to do so. 35 Schmitt, who considered himself Hobbes's 20th-century representative and has become the totem of modern unilateralists, is even clearer on this point. For him, law rests on a capacity for (political) decision that is pre-legal and extra-legal. 36 The corollary of this point in respect of inter-state relations is a simple inversion of the 'friends analogy' I presented a few moments ago. In Schmitt's account, the end product is a society of enemies. That project has two main flaws. First, while ostensibly aimed at shoring up Parliament's sovereignty, its main effect is to protect executive discretionary authority. Second, it seeks to recapture a legal past that never existed -or in as much as it did, a past that has gone and ought not to be recaptured. To take the historical claims of this project seriously would amount to the wholesale resuscitation of Boye Sahaba and its ilk. 1911 -1914 -1922 -1932 -1945 -1973 -1998 . Others will have their own variation. Mine includes 'external' events (the end of the Seven Years War, which confirmed Britain as the leading imperial power; the American Declaration of Independence; the French Revolution) because I don't see how the British constitution, and the dominant narratives that relate to it, make sense otherwise. Certainly, the power that was bound up with the notion of the Crown has transferred to a government detached from the monarch other than for ceremonial purposes.
Note that these developments were effected much later than Finnis's effective shut-off date. The reality that public lawyers have to grapple with is the existence of a governing apparatus (constitution) that has not formally changed all that much since 1688 -and probably earlier -combined with fundamental, very real changes in both the operating dynamics of that apparatus and the normative environment in which it operates and which makes sense of it and sustains it. These are the basic conditions of the British constitution. Its 'slow, laborious history of adjustment' has produced a gulf between substance and form, complicated by the fact that reforms 'have been effected through understandings and practices which are not formally reflected in law.' 64 Other than in Finnis's self-serving fantasy, the Crown in Parliament, far from being 'unambiguous', is a problem for public lawyers akin to the Trinity for theologians. 65 . 68 There is also the problem that contemporaries didn't tend to understand what they were doing in such terms. As Finnis accepts, they tended to avoid (Lockean or republican) arguments that rested on the constituent capacity of the people, justifying their actions on conservative and restorative grounds. 69 The effect of this was that while 1688 reinforced constitutionalism in that it left the parliamentary and legal fabric in a position to remedy its own predicament, it was if anything a victory for the ancient constitution. 70 As J.G.A. Pocock observes, James II's failure to resort to the weapon of civil war entailed that subjects were never really obliged to choose between competing claimants to sovereignty:
There had been a desertion but not a dissolution; the people had neither declared nor discovered the government to be dissolved, and if they had done anything it had been to frustrate the king's ineffective attempts to dissolve it. 'Government' could therefore be defined less as 'sovereignty' than as 'constitution'. 71 This perspective in turn opened the way to belief in the constitution's persistence in the teeth of Stuart and Cromwellian attempts to overthrow it, a persistent and powerful trope within British constitutional discourse. But it is the conceptual dimension that is the more interesting, and in the end more damaging to Finnis. He speaks as the defender of the political constitution whose defining institutional feature, settled in 1688, was the sovereignty 82 The real target should be the Act itself and the demos that seems (just about) to support it. 83 Nor I think can judges be blamed for endeavouring to produce juridical coherence out of a series of discrete but seemingly related changes in the political constitution, the most significant features of which have been sanctioned by Parliament. It is as though they have been handed most of the material for a patchwork quilt, together with some but incomplete design instructions. Criticism of this or that bit of stitching might be justified. But they can't really be blamed for seeking to work out how some of the material can be stitched together or, in so doing, for having views on the overall design of the quilt.
The court's constitutional role, while unquestionably enlarged, is still essentially responsive and reactive. Judges act according to the specific instructions given to them by Parliament, a task that often involves the interpretation of vague or incomplete directions (e.g. HRA s.3).
But they also act, I suggest, in pursuance to a more general obligation that, while tacitly sanctioned by Parliament perhaps, is probably not Parliament's to give or withhold. This is the obligation wherever possible to seek coherence and rationality in the application of our laws and meaning within our constitutional order. But we need to escape this looking-glass world of originalism. Fortunately, Finnis also defends prerogative as a discretionary zone of executive power, untouchable by courts, on the basis of precedent and what he calls 'basic constitutionality'. Well, precedent is against him now. We have CCSU, 86 Fire Brigades Union, 87 Everett (on passports), 88 Abbasi, 89 Only this understanding of Parliament's supremacy can make it fit with that other constitutional fundamental, the separation of powers, and the old republican idea to which it relates that the exercise of public power must be open to scrutiny and challenge. 121 To take the idea seriously would be to give Parliament a more prominent role in foreign affairs. The gathering constitutional convention that would seem to require government to obtain Parliament's approval prior to an exercise of armed force is a necessary and long overdue step. 122 The stronger prerogatives of the German Bundestag in this context might provide comparative inspiration, as evidenced in a recent German Federal Constitutional Court case concerned with the scope of parliamentary approval for military operations in exigent circumstances.
8.
What about the courts? On one hand, it is clear that, as Lord Kerr put it in Lord Carlile v Home Secretary, while the court must accord to the executive due deference, it is not required to genuflect in its presence. 124 On the other hand, it is elementary that courts must be especially mindful of the limits of their authority as their influence in this area increases.
Their practice has been fairly consistent on this point. The court does not allow itself to be used as trier of policy. Cases construed as such receive short shrift. I mentioned Noor Khan (challenge to the supply of intelligence to support US drone strikes) and Marchiori (challenge to the Trident nuclear programme) much earlier in the article. Gentle v Prime Minister and the CND case, both of which amounted in the court's view to a challenge to the legality of the Iraq war, also fit into this category. 125 Nor does the court allow itself to be converted into a kind of free-floating international law court. In Al-Haq v Foreign Secretary, the court was asked for a declaration that the UK was in breach of international law in providing financial and military support for Israel, when the latter was conducting an armed assault on the Gaza
Strip. The court at first instance robustly denied permission to apply for judicial review. History is not just something that was, but is also something that is constantly being remade.
The other part of the answer, and the real ballast in the end, is belief of a certain quality. Law rests on belief -on the opinion of the people, as Hume put it. It is the belief system of those who must live together but can't otherwise agree on how best to. As such, it is perhaps the only belief system available for non-believers, as writers from Hobbes to Habermas have argued. We are asked daily, in our social interactions and as citizens and officials, to affirm this non-believers' creed. We need to ensure that when the state in any of its guises faces the choice between law and pure force, it doesn't allow itself to select the latter.
